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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For over 100 years debate has raged in academia and in the courts over the 
standards of admissibility for expert testimony.  From Learned Hand to Frye v. 
United States to the Federal Rules of Evidence and beyond, courts and commentators 
have struggled with the threshold for expert testimony.  For scientific and technical 
testimony, the changing world has only exacerbated the difficulty of the issue.  One 
hundred years ago, quantum mechanics didn’t exist, the theory of relativity had yet 
to be invented (and superceded), and the quark hadn’t been discovered.  As far as the 
stock market was concerned, trades were executed by hand and the New York Stock 
Exchange bore a closer resemblance to the men who executed the Buttonwood Tree 
Agreement than today’s computerized trading pits.  As science and technology have 
evolved, so has the test for expert testimony in these areas. 
In class action securities litigation, a pitched battle is often fought over the size of 
the class.  The question boils down to how many of the shares purchased during the 
class period are shares which are traded during the class period for the first time and 
how many shares are traded repeatedly throughout the class period.  Those shares 
which are traded in the class period for the first time are damaged to the full extent of 
the fraud.  Shares which trade more than once during the class period count towards 
reported volume, but can only be damaged to the full extent of the fraud once.  For 
example, A buys a share of stock after the price is inflated by fraud.  While the stock 
price is still inflated by the fraud, A sells his share to B.  Reported class period 
volume will reflect at least two shares purchased.3  But A has recouped some or all of 
his loss by selling at an inflated price, and if the market price was still inflated by the 
full value of the false information, only B has suffered the full extent of the fraud.  
Determining how much of reported volume during the class period represents 
repurchases and how much represents new purchases is thus critical to determining 
class-wide damages.  
To solve this problem, experts use the Proportionate Trading Model (“PTM”).  
The PTM assumes that a fixed proportion of shares purchased on each day represent 
newly traded versus previously traded shares.  While there is some debate over 
whether the shares should be drawn in equal proportions or some other proportion, 
virtually every expert, whether testifying for the defendants or plaintiffs, now uses 
some form of the PTM. 
The Supreme Court, in a trilogy of cases in the 1990s, set forth the requirements 
for admissibility of expert testimony.  It is the authors’ contention that the PTM, 
                                                                
3If the stock is traded on the NASDAQ, more than two shares can be reflected in reported 
volume.  See infra note 67, and accompanying text. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/5
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drawing shares into the new and previously traded groups in equal proportions, 
meets the criteria for admission. 
II.  EVOLUTION OF TEST FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
A.  Learned Hand 
Judge Learned Hand kicked off the modern dispute about expert testimony with 
an article in Harvard Law Review published in 1900.4  Judge Hand begins the article 
by stating that “[t]here are good historical reasons” for calling expert witnesses, “but 
they by no means justify” doing so, and it is “an anomaly fertile of much practical 
inconvenience.”5  Thus the modern hostility to expert testimony was born, or at least 
given its first influential public airing. 
Judge Hand’s objection to expert testimony was premised on the expert’s 
inability to testify to the facts of the case and his ability to testify only to general 
propositions on his area of expertise.6  The problem for Judge Hand was how the jury 
was to choose between conflicting expert testimony.  If the jury had experience in 
the subject matter, the experts would be unnecessary; if they had no experience, how 
can they choose which expert to believe?  “It is just because they are incompetent for 
such a task that the expert is necessary at all.”7  Judge Hand’s solution to this 
dilemma was to suggest an independent tribunal of experts to hear the expert 
testimony.8  This tribunal would decide which general propositions to put to the jury, 
and the jury could then apply these general propositions to the facts of the case.9 
B.  Frye v. United States 
The seminal case of Frye v. United States,10 which stood as the standard for 
admissibility of expert testimony for seventy years, is two pages long.  At issue was 
the appellate court’s refusal to admit exculpatory evidence of a primitive polygraph, 
or lie detector test.11  The court recognized that expert testimony was admissible, but 
stated  
[j]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere 
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be 
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert 
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or 
                                                                
4Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Concerning Expert Testimony, 
15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1900). 
5Id. at 40. 
6Id. at 50-52. 
7Id. at 54. 
8Id. at 56. 
9Id. 
10293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
11Id. at 1013. The test in question measured changes in blood pressure as the respondent 
answered questions. 
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discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs.12   
This brief opinion would be followed for seventy years, even after the passage of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 
To some extent, the Frye test performs some of the function Judge Hand 
envisioned in 1900.  By insisting on general acceptance in the scientific community, 
the scientific community is, in effect, acting as the expert tribunal of Judge Hand.  
The scientific community weeds out the good science from the bad and the general 
propositions put to the jury to aid it in its deliberations are those on which there is 
widespread agreement.  Thus, the jury should be spared the task of having to choose 
between experts with regard to general scientific principles, but not with regard to 
application of those principles. 
C.  Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
The Federal Rules of Evidence were passed in 1975.  The question of whether the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rules 401, 402, and 702, superceded the 
Frye test was not addressed in the Rules, the Advisory Committee’s Notes, the 
Congressional Committee Reports, or the hearing on the Federal Rules.  Rule 401 
defines “relevant evidence” as that which has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable.13  Rule 402 states that all relevant evidence is admissible, unless 
otherwise prescribed.14  Rule 702, which specifically governs the admissibility of 
expert testimony, states that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact in issue, a witness may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise.”15  Courts were split over whether the Federal Rules of 
Evidence superceded the Frye test for the next twenty years.16 
                                                                
12Id. at 1014. 
13FED. R. EVID. 401.  “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence.”  Id. 
14FED. R. EVID. 402.  “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by 
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules 
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.  Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible.”  Id. 
15Fed. R. Evid. 702.   
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, 
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness 
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
Id. 
16For a detailed description of the Frye debate, see Symposium on Science and the Rules of 
Evidence, 99 Fed. R. Dec. 187 (William A. Thomas, ed., 1983). 
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D.  The Daubert/Joiner/Kumho Tire Trilogy 
1.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,17 the Supreme Court decided 
two questions.  The first was whether the Frye test of general acceptance survived 
the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The second was what standard should 
be applied if the Frye test was not used. 
The facts of Daubert are relatively simple.  The parents of a minor born with 
birth defects sued the maker of the drug Bendectin, alleging the mother’s use of the 
drug during pregnancy caused the birth defects.18  The defendant moved for 
summary judgment, claiming there was no admissible evidence that Bendectin 
caused birth defects in humans.19  The defendant submitted an affidavit of an 
epidemologist who stated he had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and birth 
defects (30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients) and no study found 
that Bendectin was capable of causing malformations in human fetuses.20  The 
plaintiffs countered with eight experts of their own, who concluded that Bendectin 
can cause birth defects.21  These experts based their conclusions on animal test-tube 
studies, live animal studies, and the reanalysis of previously published studies which 
had concluded there was no causation.22  The trial judge refused to admit the 
evidence, holding that it did not meet the general acceptance standard; the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the same grounds.23 
In determining whether Frye survived the passage of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the Court began with Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402.24  Rule 402 
states “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided. . . .  
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”25  Rule 401 defines relevant 
evidence as “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.”26  After considering the specific text of Rule 702 and the 
“liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court held that the Frye test 
was not assimilated into Rule 702.27  Ultimately, the Court held “[t]hat austere 
                                                                
17509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
18Id. at 582. 
19Id. 
20Id. 
21Id. at 583.  The credentials of the experts were beyond reproach.  Id. at 582. 
22Id. 
23951 F.2d 1128 (1991). 
24Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-88. 
25FED. R. EVID. 402. 
26FED. R. EVID. 401. 
27Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89. 
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[general acceptance] standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.”28 
Having determined that the Frye test did not apply, the Court examined the 
gatekeeping responsibilities of the trial judge.  The Court began with the definitions 
of “scientific” and “knowledge.”  Scientific “implies a grounding in the methods and 
procedures of science.”29  Knowledge “connotes more than subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation.”30  While acknowledging that the subject of the scientific 
testimony need not be known to a certainty, because there are arguably no certainties 
in science, the Court noted that the inference or assertion “must be derived by the 
scientific method.”31  In a footnote, the Court took pains to distinguish between 
scientific reliability, scientific validity, and evidentiary reliability.32  Scientific 
reliability is whether the application of the principle produces consistent results.33  
Scientific validity is whether the principle supports what it purports to show.34  
Evidentiary reliability, for scientific evidence, will be based on scientific validity.35  
The Court held that a trial judge must make a “preliminary assessment of whether 
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of 
whether that reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in issue.”36 
The initial inquiry is whether the expert testimony “will assist the trier of fact 
understand or determine a fact in issue.”37 
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory 
or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be 
whether it can be (and has been) tested.  “Scientific methodology today is 
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be 
falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from 
other fields of human inquiry.”38 
The second consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected 
to peer review and publication.  The Court, however, took pains to point out this 
factor is not dispositive.39  The third consideration is the known or potential rate of 
                                                                
28Id. at 589. 
29Id. at 590. 
30Id. 
31Id. 
32Id. at 590 n.9 
33Id. at 599. 
34Id. 
35Id. 
36Id. at 592-93. 
37Id. at 592. 
38Id. at 593 (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in 
Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. 
U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992)). 
39Id. 
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error and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s 
operations.40  The final factor is the “general acceptance” of the theory: Widespread 
acceptance can be an important factor in admitting testimony and minimal support 
may be a factor in excluding it.41 
The Court emphasized the Rule 702 inquiry was flexible, and the “overarching 
subject is the scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability of 
the principles that underlie a proposed submission.  The focus, of course, must be 
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”42  
It also addressed the concerns that abandonment of the general acceptance test would 
“result in a free-for-all in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and 
irrational pseudoscientific assertions.”43  The Court rejected such concerns, holding 
that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful 
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of 
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”44 
The unspoken undercurrent in the Daubert opinion, and the subject of fierce 
debate in the lower courts and academia, was how to deal with expert testimony 
based on “junk science.”  The Daubert Court never explicitly uses this term, 
although the testimony at issue is what some would consider to be a paradigmatic 
example of junk science.  At its core, the plaintiffs’ experts in Daubert took 
overwhelmingly convincing evidence to the contrary, and without doing any 
additional scientific studies, simply concluded that the original scientists’ work 
supported the opposite conclusion than the one originally stated.  The closest the 
Daubert Court comes to addressing this issue is an aside when it states that the study 
of the moon “will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was 
unusually likely to have behaved irrationally” on the night of a full moon.45  Even so, 
the Daubert Court stops short of saying the plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony at issue was 
inadmissible.  The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with 
the opinion.  The door was thus left open that the testimony, questionable though it 
may have been, was in fact admissible, and the adversary system, through effective 
advocacy, cross-examination, and opposing experts, would expose the testimony as 
being not credible, or at least much less credible than the opposing side’s testimony. 
                                                                
40Id. at 594. 
41Id. 
42Id. at 594-95. 
43Id. at 595. 
44Id. at 596. 
45Id. at 591.  Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part in General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), returned to this theme.  “An example of ‘junk science’ that 
should be excluded under Daubert as too unreliable would be the testimony of a phrenologist 
who would purport to prove a defendant’s future dangerousness based on the contours of the 
defendant’s skull.”  Id. at 154 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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2.  General Electric Co. v. Joiner 
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,46 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine which standard should be applied by an appellate court reviewing a 
decision to admit or exclude testimony under Daubert.  The short answer to this 
question is that an abuse of discretion standard should be applied.47  The Court then 
went beyond the scope of its grant of certiorari and discussed whether, when 
applying this standard, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert 
testimony.48  
In Joiner, the plaintiff was an electrician who was exposed to PCBs in the course 
of his work.  The plaintiff alleged that his exposure to PCBs “promoted” his lung 
cancer; specifically, had it not been for his exposure to PCBs, his lung cancer would 
not have developed for years, if at all.  The trial court ruled that although there was a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was exposed to PCBs, the plaintiff’s 
experts’ testimony failed to show a link between PCBs and small-cell lung cancer, 
and was, therefore, inadmissible.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
“[b]ecause the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony display a 
preference for admissibility, we apply a particularly stringent standard of review to 
the trial judge’s exclusion of expert testimony.”49  The Supreme Court held that the 
“particularity stringent” standard was erroneous, and the correct standard was the 
usual abuse of discretion.50 
The plaintiff’s experts had relied upon animal studies, in which mice were 
exposed to PCBs, as well as epidemiological studies.  The Court examined whether 
these studies could have been a proper foundation for the testimony at issue.  As 
phrased by the Court, “whether animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an 
expert’s opinion was not the issue.  The issue was whether these expert’s opinions 
were sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purported to rely.”51  
In so phrasing the issue, the Joiner Court seems to have run afoul of the Daubert 
Court’s admonition that the focus be on principles and methodology, not the 
conclusions drawn therefrom.  But answering this criticism, the Court stated that 
“conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct.”52 
3.  Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael 
Daubert involved expert scientific testimony.  In the six years that followed 
Daubert, the lower courts were divided as to whether the principles set forth in 
Daubert applied only to expert scientific testimony or also to technical and other 
                                                                
46522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
47Id. at 139. 
48Id. at 142. 
4978 F.3d 524, 529 (11th Cir. 1996). 
50522 U.S. at 142. 
51Id. at 144. 
52Id. at 146. 
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expert testimony.53  The Supreme Court decided the issue in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. 
Carmichael.54 
Kumho Tire involved a products liability lawsuit against a tire manufacturer for a 
blow-out that caused death and serious injury.55  An engineer testified for the 
plaintiff concerning the cause of the blow-out, claiming it was due to a defect in 
manufacture or design.56  The trial court excluded his testimony, relying on Daubert, 
but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Daubert only applied to scientific 
testimony.57  The Supreme Court, after looking at the express language of Rule 702 
(“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”) and its prior holding in 
Daubert (stating it was referring to scientific testimony “because that was the nature 
of the expertise at issue”), held that Daubert applied to all expert testimony.58 
The Court then considered the question of whether the four factors mentioned in 
Daubert were mandatory and exclusive.  The answer was no to both questions.  
Quoting from Daubert, the Kumho Tire Court stated that the Daubert factors do not 
constitute a “definitive checklist or test,” and, quoting from the Solicitor General’s 
brief, the Court stated that the “factors identified in Daubert may or may not be 
pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s 
particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.”59 
The Kumho Tire Court took pains to point out that each Daubert factor might not 
apply in every case.  “It might not be surprising in a particular case, for example, that 
a claim made by a scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for 
the particular application at issue may never previously have interested any 
scientist.”60  Again alluding to but not mentioning “junk science,” the Court stated 
that general acceptance is useless when the entire discipline lacks reliability, citing 
astrology and necromancy as examples.61  The objective of the gatekeeping 
requirement is to ensure reliability and relevancy and to make certain the expert 
“employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the 
                                                                
53Compare Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
Daubert applies to engineering testimony); Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 366-71 (7th 
Cir. 1996); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 296-98 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 520 U.S. 1196 (1997), with Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518-19 
(10th Cir.) (holding that Daubert does not apply to expert testimony of engineering car 
rollover case), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996); Desrosiers v. Flight Int’l of Fla. Inc., 156 
F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Daubert “may not apply to expert testimony based 
on technical, rather than scientific, knowledge.”). 
54526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
55Id. at 142. 
56Id. at 143. 
57Id. at 146. 
58Id. at 147-48. 
59Id. at 150. 
60Id. at 151. 
61Id. 
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practice of an expert in the relevant field.”62  To date, this has been the last word 
from the Supreme Court on the subject. 
III.  TRADING MODELS 
Trading models are commonly used as a tool to determine the number of shares 
traded in a class period to assess damages in securities class actions.  When experts 
determine damages they do not have the actual trading records of each of the 
purchasing shareholders during the class period.  The key question for experts 
testifying as to damages in securities cases is whether the trading model will satisfy 
the criteria laid out in Daubert/Joiner/Kumho Tire; specifically, whether the 
principles and methodology used employed the appropriate level of intellectual rigor 
in the field.  The testifying expert in a securities case will calculate damages by 
determining how much the price per share was artificially inflated, multiplied by the 
total number of shares damaged.  The shares are damaged when the stock price is 
artificially inflated by false and misleading statements disseminated to public, 
causing the price of the stock to be higher than the price the market would place on 
the stock if only truthful information had been available to traders.63  Once the fraud 
is revealed or the market no longer places value on the false statement, the inflation 
is removed from the stock price and the market value represents the stock’s true 
value.  As a result, shareholders who purchased during the period of artificial 
inflation (the class period) suffer damages.  A key variable in the damage calculation 
is how many shares traded during the class period represent shares that were 
purchased prior to the class period (and thus were previously purchased at an 
uninflated price) and how many shares purchased during the class period represent 
shares which have already been traded during the class period (and thus been 
previously purchased at a price already inflated by the fraud).  Shares purchased for 
the first time during the class period and held until the end of the class period are 
commonly referred to as “retained shares and have been damaged to the full extent 
of the artificial inflation.”64  Shares purchased during the class period and resold 
during the class period are referred to as “in-and-out” shares.65  The issue for the 
trading model to decide is how many shares purchased during the class period were 
later sold during the class period and are thus “in-and-out” shares and how many 
shares purchased during the class period were retained until the end of the class 
period. 
                                                                
62Id. 
63Michael Barclay & Frank C. Torchio, Complex Litigation at the Millenium:  A 
Comparison of Trading Models Used for Calculating Aggregate Damages in Securities 
Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 106 (2001). 
64Retained shares are damaged by the amount that the stock was artificially inflated when 
the shareholder purchased them. 
65In-and-out shares may be damaged if there is partial disclosure of the fraud during the 
class period, creating partial damages to the shareholder, or if the value of the false 
information changes.  For a lengthy discussion of in-and-out damages, see Green v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring).  In-and-out 
purchasers are often included in the class for class certification purposes.  See The Nathan 
Gordon Trust v. Northgate Exploration, Ltd., 148 F.R.D. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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A.  Determining the Universe of Shares Available to Trade 
The starting point of any trading model is to determine how many shares are 
available to trade during the class period and how many were actually traded.  
Initially, the “adjusted volume-to-float” ratio is determined by calculating the total 
number of shares that could have been traded on a given day (the float) and dividing 
by the adjusted volume.66  The adjusted volume is calculated by starting with the 
total reported volume and eliminating reported volume attributable to intra-day 
market makers, specialist trades, and insider trades.67  The float is determined by 
subtracting the number of shares that have been known not to trade during the class 
period from the total outstanding shares.68  The adjusted volume-to-float ratio is an 
important factor in all trading models.  As the float declines, so does the number of 
retained shares; conversely, as the float increases, the number of retained shares 
increases.69  
B.  Early Versions of the Proportionate Trading Model (Single Trader Model) 
The early version of the PTM would be considered crude by today’s standards.  
Ten years ago the PTM used gross volume figures without reductions for market 
makers or specialists, did not adjust float to control for shares held by insiders, and 
did not use institutional trading data.70  This crude model thus used very high float 
and volume figures and treated institutional investors (who publicly report their 
trades) and individual investors (who do not) as fungible entities in the model.  Using 
unadjusted trading volume and raw float, each share (whether held by an institution 
or an individual) would be given an equal probability of trading the next day.  
Whatever the merits or lack thereof of this approach, it bears little resemblance to the 
multi-trader PTM commonly used today. 
C.  Multi-Trader Models 
There are several different variations of the PTM.  Each of the models have 
different formulas and factors.  The models can initially be divided into the single-
trader PTM and the multi-trader PTM.  One of the multi-trader models, the two 
trader model, divides the shares of stock into two groups: shares held by active 
traders and shares held by passive traders.71  Each of these groups is assigned a 
different acceleration factor, which is a proportionality assumption about trading 
propensities.  Proportional trading models assume that every share purchased has an 
equal chance of being sold on a subsequent day in the class period and thus have an 
                                                                
66Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 107. 
67Id.  For instance, a stock traded on the NASDAQ is sold by one market maker and bought 
by another market maker, meaning two trades are reported but only one share is sold. 
68Id.  This can be determined from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings by 
institutions or insiders. 
69Id. 
70See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, The Use of Trading Models to Estimate 
Aggregate Damages in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Proposal for Change, in SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTIONS: ABUSES AND REMEDIES (Nat’l Legal Center for the Public Interest 1994). 
71Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 108. 
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acceleration factor of one.  If the acceleration factor rises above one, however, shares 
purchased during the class period are more likely to have been sold later in the class 
period.72  If the acceleration factor is less than one (actually, a deceleration factor), 
the purchased shares are less likely to be sold later in the class period.73  An 
accelerated trading model uses an acceleration factor of more than one, as opposed to 
the most commonly used PTM among testifying experts for plaintiffs, which has an 
acceleration factor of exactly one.74  With a higher acceleration factor, shares that 
have traded during the class period are more likely to be re-traded during the class 
period than shares that have not traded yet.75  Some multi-trader models divide 
traders into two or more groups with different acceleration factors.  One multi-trader 
model commonly used by defense testifying experts has two groups, one in which 
“active traders” are assumed to have held 20% of a company’s stock and have an 
acceleration factor 20 times that of “passive” traders, who are assumed to hold 80% 
of the stock.76 
Barclay and Torchio describe a PTM, with an acceleration factor of one, 
commonly used by plaintiffs’ testifying experts in which institutional trading data is 
used to adjust the available float.  Shares which are known not to have traded during 
the class period are removed from shares available to trade.77  The group of shares 
with a known trading propensity of zero is removed from the calculations, making it 
in essence a two-trader PTM with a group of known non-traders and a group of 
traders with an acceleration factor of one.78  In these circumstances, the results of a 
two-trader PTM with a set of non-traders and a set of proportionate traders with an 
acceleration factor of one is very similar (89% correlation) to a four trader model in 
which the group with the highest propensity to trade has an acceleration factor 40 
times greater than the lowest propensity trading group.79  
Distinctions between the PTM and Multi-Trader PTM are further muted in cases 
where there are longer class periods.  The statute of limitations for Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) violations is five years and at least three 
years for Securities Act of 1993 violations.80  Thus, in cases with a five year class 
                                                                
72Use of an acceleration factor has been criticized as placing an artificial cap on damages.  
Craig J. McCann & David Hsu, Accelerated Trading Models Used in Securities Class Action 
Lawsuits, 8 J. LEGAL ECON. 1, 3 (1998-99). 
73Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 107. 
74A decelerated trading model has an acceleration factor of less than one.  The most 
extreme example is a decelerated trading model in which no shares represent shares already 
traded, which can only be assumed until adjusted volume equals float available to trade.  This 
extreme deceleration model maximizes damages in the shortest period. 
75Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 107-08; McCann & Hsu, supra note 72, at 7. 
76Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 111.  Not surprisingly, the popular defense model 
results in the lowest possible damages. Id. 
77Id. at 112. 
78Id. 
79Id. 
80See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) (five year statute of limitations for Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77m (three year statute of limitations for Securities Act violations.)  It is a matter of dispute 
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period, there should be no discernable differences between the models, because no 
matter what acceleration factor is used, traded shares will usually exceed volume.  
IV.  DAUBERT SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE USE OF THE  
PROPORTIONATE TRADING MODEL 
The critical issue is whether the PTM meets the criteria for expert testimony set 
forth in Daubert.  As the plaintiffs have the burden of proof of damages for cases 
under the Exchange Act,81 failure to have the testimony admitted would be fatal.82  
This issue, surprisingly, is not litigated often. 
A.  Limited Case Law Discussing the Proportionate Trading Model 
There is sparse case law on the admissibility of the PTM.  One early case, RMED 
Int’l, Inc. v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, Inc. was the subject of both an opinion by the 
Magistrate Judge (“RMED I”) and later the Article 3 Judge (“RMED II”) handling 
the case.  In RMED I,83 the expert calculated inflation per share (by measuring the 
difference between closing prices and “true value”) and then calculated the aggregate 
class damages by multiplying the inflation per share by the number of shares 
affected, using the PTM.84 
In RMED II,85 the defendants asked the judge to set aside the magistrate’s order 
admitting the expert testimony.  The court declined, stating that 
Surely, every [s]tock pricing model will be subject to some form of 
statistical criticism or unwanted interpretation.  The court also recognizes 
that aggregate damages in securities fraud cases are generally incapable of 
mathematical precision.  Nevertheless, to the extent defendants’ concerns 
about [the expert’s] analysis are valid, they go to the weight and 
credibility of her testimony, not its admissibility.86   
                                                          
whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 changed the statute of limitations for Securities Act 
claims from three years to five years in 2002.  See In re Global Crossing Sec. Litig., 2003WL 
22999478, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
extended statute of limitations for Securities Act to five years because claims were negligence-
based).  The holding of Global Crossing may have been overruled by the Second Circuit when 
it held that a claim under the Securities Act that “sounds in fraud” must comply with the 
requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  See Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 
2004).  As the language of Sarbanes-Oxley states that statute of limitations for a private right 
of action that “involves a claim of fraud [or] deceit is five years,” a plausible argument can be 
made that if a claim under the Securities Act “sounds in fraud,” Sarbanes-Oxley extended the 
statute of limitations for such a claim to five years. 
8115 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4). 
82The burden of proof of damages is reversed under the Securities Act, with a presumption 
of damages and a burden on defendants to disprove damages if they can.  15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(e). 
832000 WL 310352 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2000). 
84Id. at *5.  The opinion does not explicitly state that the proportionate trading model was 
used, but the expert has informed the authors that it was. 
852000 WL 420548 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2000). 
86Id. at *2 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
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The defendants’ remedy was vigorous  cross-examination or a rebuttal expert.87 
In Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc.,88 the court rejected an expert’s use of the PTM.  
The court stated that the plaintiff’s expert admitted that the PTM did not meet any of 
the Daubert standards.  In criticizing the PTM, the defendants’ expert used a 
reliability test for economic theory developed by Milton Friedman:  “The reliability 
of an economic theory is tested by comparing it to reality.”89  The plaintiff’s expert 
stated that the model was never tested against reality and the court noted it was never 
accepted by professional economists and “seems to be a theory developed more for 
securities litigation than anything else.”90 
The statements/admissions by the plaintiff’s expert in Kaufman seems odd, but 
odder still is the court’s analysis.  First, use of Friedman’s test for reliability seems 
out of place in this context.  Some theories are impossible to test against reality.  
Second, calculating the number of shares damaged by a securities fraud, almost by 
definition, will not be of interest to anyone other than a testifying expert in a lawsuit.  
It is not surprising the theory was developed in a litigation context. 
B.  Academic Criticism of the Proportionate Trading Model 
The PTM has long been a target of the defense bar and their experts.  Since the 
PTM is often used by experts testifying on behalf of plaintiffs, it is squarely within 
the sights of defendants as a way to limit their exposure.91 
                                                                
87Id. 
882000 WL 1506892 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2000). 
89Id. at *2.  This is a very odd test to use in a litigation context.  A testifying damages 
expert in a securities or antitrust case will inevitably hypothesize about what would have 
happened “but-for” the wrongdoing.  Since the wrong did occur (which is the only reality we 
then have), there is no unaltered reality to compare the “but-for” hypothesis to.  See Andrew I. 
Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning the Increasingly Fine Line Between the Admissibility and 
Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J., 663, 674 
(establishing level of control necessary to create a “but-for” reality is virtually impossible to 
achieve).  In a sense, it is a variation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which states that if 
an object’s precise momentum is known, its position cannot be known with exact certainty.  
Likewise, an expert can know precisely what happened in a universe in which the wrong 
occurred, but can never state with absolute certainty what would have happened had the wrong 
not occurred. 
90Id. 
91Ironically, defendants may soon be hoisted on their own petard on this issue.  Plaintiffs 
are now bringing what are referred to as “holder” cases in state court for breach of fiduciary 
duty or common law fraud claims on behalf of buyers who held stock before the class period 
and did not sell during the class period.  See, e.g., Small v. Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 
2003) (alleging claims on behalf of a holder class for common law fraud); In re Worldcom 
Sec. Litig., 336 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying claims on behalf of a holder class 
for breach of fiduciary duty); Meyer v. Putnam Int’l Voyager Fund, 2004 WL 199833 (D. 
Mass. Jan. 27, 2004) (alleging claims on behalf of holder class for breach of fiduciary duty).  
Retained shares in a federal fraud action plus the shares representing holders who did not 
purchase during the class period must add up to the float.  The defense tactic of using mega-
acceleration factors minimizes federal securities fraud damages, but maximizes state holder 
claim damages. 
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One early critique, by a popular defense expert, did not appear in a peer-reviewed 
journal, but in a privately published compendium of articles by the securities defense 
bar.  In the article, Fischel and Ross list six perceived problems with the PTM: 1) 
over-estimating volume, 2) “outs-and-ins”, 3) derivative or other securities, 4) no-
shows and opt-outs, 5) indirect empirical tests, and 6) direct empirical tests.92  We 
discuss each in turn. 
Fischel and Ross’s first criticism is that the reported volume during the class 
period may overstate the number of shares actually traded due to activity by market 
makers or specialists.  This is not truly a criticism of the PTM, however.  No matter 
what assumptions are used concerning the propensity of shares to trade during the 
class period, reported volume will have to be reduced to account for market makers 
and specialists.  This has no direct bearing on the accuracy or inaccuracy of the 
PTM.  It is merely a factual assumption that provides a starting point for any trading 
model, and most experts using a version of the PTM will, in fact, reduce reported 
volume to account for market makers and specialists. 
The second criticism is that the PTM does not estimate the number of investors 
who sold shares that were purchased prior to the class period.  “[I]t provides no 
mechanism for finding out the extent to which investors avoided injury because they 
were out-and-in during the Class Period (first selling and then buying).”93  Fischel 
and Ross examined institutional holdings for one year of Intel Corp. and stated that 
60 million shares were purchased by institutions and held until the end of the year, 
but institutions sold 14 million shares during the year prior to their purchases.  
“Thus, only 77% of the retained shares were retained by shareholders who were not 
out-and-in.”94  The factual predicate of this statement is sketchy and the significance, 
if any, is left unsaid.  Fischel and Ross conspicuously do not state that the institutions 
that sold shares are the same institutions which later bought and retained shares.  
Therefore, the assumption that 23% of retained shares were retained by previous 
sellers is not a given.  Furthermore, even if it were true, Fischel and Ross do not state 
what significance this fact has.  Under this theory, a buyer who buys stock prior to 
the class period (at an uninflated price) and sells the stock during the class period (at 
an artificially inflated price) may actually benefit from the fraud.95  For every 
securities fraud committed, there are countless unnamed beneficiaries: those people 
who sold stock during the class period at inflated prices.  The “out-and-in” criticism 
seems to be saying that one person’s gain from the fraud must be used to offset the 
losses suffered by some other class member.96  This argument was recently rejected 
by a judge in the Southern District of New York.97  Likewise, Fischel and Ross state 
                                                                
92See Fischel & Ross, supra note 70. 
93Id. at 138.  They concede the PTM controls for “in-and-outs” during the class period. 
94Id. 
95This “out-and-in” would not be a class member, because he did not purchase shares 
during the class period. 
96Typically, a class member who is “in-and-out” during a class period, that is, buying and 
then selling, will have either no recognized loss or a much smaller recognized loss than a class 
member who is only a purchaser. 
97See In re Blech Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 1610775, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2003) 
(holding that defendants are not entitled to an offset for out-and-ins). 
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that the PTM does not purport to calculate which purchasers of common stock may 
have sold calls or purchased put options and thus profited from the fraud.  What 
Fischel and Ross seem to be saying is that the damages a purchaser suffers from 
buying a stock at a fraudulently inflated price are mitigated if he has sold stock or 
options at an inflated price.  This may or may not be true, but has no bearing on the 
accuracy of the PTM. 
Fischel and Ross’s fourth criticism is that not all class members file proofs of 
claim.  “At best, the [PTM] predicts trading patterns.  It does not provide any 
information about which class members will file claims.”98  That some class 
members will fail to submit a proof of claim to participate in a recovery is axiomatic: 
Some class members cannot be located, some cannot be bothered, some simply do 
not understand.99  It is true that the PTM does not predict the number of non-
participating class members; the PTM makes no attempt to do so.  What is unclear is 
the significance of this truism.  The PTM attempts to estimate the total number of 
shares traded during a class period and whether those shares were inflated by fraud.  
Whether the buyer of the share chooses to submit a proof of claim or not is irrelevant 
to the issue of whether that share was damaged.100  The criticism that the PTM fails 
to predict the number of class members who will not submit their claims appears to 
be based on the premise that if you do not submit a proof of claim, you have not 
suffered any damages.  This is like saying that if Party A bulldozes Party B’s house 
without Party B’s permission, and Party B does not sue Party A, Party B has not 
suffered compensable damages.  Party B has clearly suffered tortious damages, but 
simply has not pressed his claim. 
Fischel and Ross also conduct what they call an “indirect empirical test,” again 
using institutional trading records for Intel for one year.  They state that the PTM 
would predict 142.6 of Intel’s 148.7 million outstanding shares were bought during 
the year, whereas institutional records state that institutions held and did not trade 
77.4 million shares.101  The flaws in this “indirect empirical test” are obvious.  
Fischel and Ross admit in a footnote that they made no adjustment to reported 
                                                                
98Fischel & Ross, supra note 70, at 139. 
99This criticism has been repeated by others.  See Robert A. Alessi, The Emerging Judicial 
Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed By Plaintiffs in Securities Class Action 
Lawsuits, 56 BUS. LAW. 483, 488-89 (2001).  The “emerging hostility” Mr. Alessi refers to 
seem to boil down to two cases, Kaufman v. Motorola, 2000 WL 1506892 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 
2000), and In re N. Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  56 BUS. 
LAW. at 483.  One court recently allowed the type of testimony excluded in Kaufman.  See In 
re Blech Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 1610775, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2003).  Thus, one could 
say there is an emerging hostility to the hostility shown in Kaufman. 
100See Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 116 (“Each shareholder faces an economic 
decision about whether the time and effort required to retrieve trading records and complete 
the proof of claims forms is worth the expected damage award.  But this individual decision 
about whether to file a claim does not alter the economic fact that a given share was 
damaged.”).  This criticism has been met with judicial skepticism.  “Whether or not class 
member ultimately submit a claim form, as long as they have not opted out they remain 
members of the class and are bound by the judgment.”  In re Blech Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 
1610775, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2004) (rejecting attack on plaintiffs’ damages expert for 
not estimating number of class members who would not file claims). 
101See Fischel & Ross, supra note 70, at 139. 
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volume, so their starting point is erroneous.102  They also do not say whether they 
adjusted the number of outstanding shares to control for shares held by insiders.  
Additionally, most damage estimates using the PTM reduce the float by shares 
known to not have been traded, usually through institutional trading reports, which 
Fischel and Ross did not do in their test. 
Finally, Fischel and Ross state that direct empirical tests undermine the PTM.  
Fischel and Ross rely on an article by two of their colleagues for this is discussed 
below.103 
In addition to Fischel and Ross’s criticisms of the PTM, Dean Furbush and 
Jeffery Smith argue that the PTM, with an acceleration factor of one, is unrealistic 
because “shares that have not traded recently are less likely to be traded than more 
recently traded shares.”104 Furbush and Smith offer no support for this integral 
assumption to their thesis,105 and to a large extent it is counter-intuitive.  A more 
compelling argument can be made that an investor, having recently spent all the time 
and money necessary to do his due diligence before purchasing a stock, is more 
likely to hold and retain the benefit of the due diligence than to sell and have to begin 
the process all over again.106 
It has also been said that the PTM, with an acceleration factor of one, maximizes 
the damage estimates.  This is demonstrably untrue.  Maximum damages are realized 
                                                                
102See Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63. 
103See infra, notes 110-122 and accompanying text. 
104Dean Furbush & Jeffrey W. Smith, Estimating the Number of Damaged Shares in 
Securities Fraud Litigation: An Introduction to Stock Trading Models, 49 BUS. LAW. 527, 541 
(1994). 
105Seven years after the Furbush and Smith article, two professors have stated that “in 
spring 2000, new orders originating from firms that cater to day traders made up 
approximately 20 percent of new orders flowing into Nasdaq stocks.”  Brad M. Barber & 
Terrance Odeon, The Internet and the Investor, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 41, 51 (2001).  Shares 
purchased by day traders are certainly more likely to trade than other shares.  However, while 
day-trading may have been a phenomenon in 2000, it is a curious footnote to history in 2004. 
106The hypothesis that recently purchased shares are more likely to trade has been 
reiterated in a recent law review article.  See John Finnerty and George Pushner, An Improved 
Two-Trader Model for Measuring Damages in Securities Fraud Actions, 8 STANFORD J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 213, 230 (2003).  Finnerty and Pushner state the that Accelerated Trading Model 
is “generally recognized by financial economists as superior to the PTM bcause of empirical 
evidence that investors trade the common stocks in their portfolios with different intensities.”  
Id.  To support this statement, Finnerty and Pushner cite to Furbush and Smith (discussed in 
note 104, supra, which offers no empirical support), Mayer (discussed in note 129, infra, 
which has no empirical support), Cone and Laurence (discussed in notes 110-122, infra and 
accompanying text, which has no empirical support), and two other unpublished articles.  The 
unpublished articles, William H. Beaver and James K. Malernee, Estimating Damages in 
Securities Fraud Cases (1999), at http://www.cornerstone.com/fram_res.html, and William H. 
Beaver, James K. Malernee, & Michael C. Keeley, Stock Trading Behavior and Damage 
Estimation in Securities Cases (1999), at http://www.cornerstone.com/fram_res.html, contain 
no empirical evidence or cite any empirical evidence.  If these “financial economists” are in 
fact relying on empirical evidence and not wishful thinking, such evidence is not evident.   
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when no share purchased during the class period has previously traded in the class 
period.107 
C.  Academic Support for the Proportionate Trading Model 
To the extent the Kaufman court relied on the empirical testing and general 
acceptance prongs of Daubert in rejecting the proportionate trading model, such 
avenues may not be open to future courts considering the issue.108  Recently, an 
article was published in Law and Contemporary Problems authored by a graduate 
business professor, Michael Barclay, at the University of Rochester, and a 
consultant, Frank C. Torchio.109  This article exposes the errors in early criticism of 
the PTM and the mythology that has surrounded and grown from these flawed 
studies.  Professor Barclay and Mr. Torchio expose the fallacies in a frequently cited 
criticism of the PTM authored by Kenneth Cone and James Laurence.110  Cone and 
Laurence purported to test the PTM against empirical evidence based on claims 
submitted in two cases and concluded that the PTM overestimated the number of 
damaged shares. 
The two cases cited by Cone and Laurence are Biben v. Card (“Midwestern”)111 
and Levit v. Aweida (“Storage Technology”).112  In Storage Technology, Cone and 
Laurence state that only 9.3 million retained shares submitted claims, whereas they 
claim the PTM predicts a class three times that size.  Barclay and Torchio show, 
however, that this analysis exposes the inherent fallacy of using claims submitted as 
a proxy for damaged shares. 
Barclay and Torchio analyzed institutional trading records and found that 
institutions owned 15.4 million shares before the class period began that were traded 
during the class period.113  Thus, at a minimum, there were 15.4 million damaged 
shares sold by institutions to class members during the class period.  Institutions 
owned only 50% of the outstanding shares,114 so shares owned and sold by 
individuals to class members must also have accounted for purchases of damaged 
shares during the class period as well.  At a minimum, the 15.4 million damaged 
shares known to have been purchased during the class period by institutions makes 
the “9.3 million buy-and-hold shares submitted for claims a misleading and 
                                                                
107The practical limitation on this is float available to trade, so that once discounted 
volume during the class period equals float available to trade, damages are maximized. 
108Even absent any academic support, testimony concerning the PTM would still be 
admissible.  See Amorgianos v. Nat’l RR Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“Where an expert otherwise reliably utilizes scientific methods to reach a conclusion, lack of 
textual support may ‘go to weight, not the admissibility’ of the expert’s testimony.”) (quoting 
McCullough v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
109Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 105. 
110See Kenneth R. Cone & James E. Laurence, How Accurate are Estimates of Aggregate 
Damages in Securities Fraud Cases?, 49 BUS. LAW. 505 (1994). 
111789 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Mo. 1992). 
112630 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Colo. 1986). 
113Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 114. 
114Id. 
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inappropriate benchmark for assessing the efficacy of any trading model.”115  
Furthermore, in a two year class period, during which the market gained 65% and 
Storage Technology lost 75% of its value, 125 million shares traded when 33 million 
shares were outstanding.116  Thus, under Cone and Laurence’s analysis, during the 
two year class period, 9.3 million shares traded of the 33 million outstanding shares, 
and almost 24 million shares did not trade.  The 9.3 million shares Cone and 
Laurence believe did trade must have traded an average of over 13 times.  The 9.3 
million number not only fails in light of Barclay and Torchio’s empirical analysis, 
but also defies any sort of common sense.  Cone and Laurence state that the PTM 
predicts about 28 million retained shares.117  This comports with intuitive judgments.  
With a volume of 125 million shares with a stock going in the opposite direction of 
the market,118 one could expect a near-total turnover of the stock, with the buy-and-
hold class members being the ones left holding the bag at the end of the class period.  
In fact, this is what the PTM predicts: 28 million of 33 million shares were bought 
and held, thus 5 million shares of the 33 million remained untraded during the class 
period.  Cone and Laurence would have one believe that 9.3 million shares were 
bought and held, and 23 million remained untraded (with a total volume during the 
class period of 125 million).  Aside from being demonstrably untrue, as the 9.3 
million shares are only 60% of institutional shares known to have been sold during 
the class period, the 9.3 million figure violates any sort of common sense given the 
volume and the float involved.  Use of claims submitted data as a proxy for all shares 
bought and held is thus improper. 
In the Midwestern case, Cone and Laurence state that the claims submitted were 
87% of the shares predicted by the PTM.  Although Barclay is quick to disclaim that 
this is empirical evidence supporting use of the PTM, he claims a difference of 13%, 
when considered with the number of class members who undoubtedly will not 
submit claims, is not empirical evidence the PTM is inaccurate.119 
Barclay counters the two cases cited by Cone and Laurence with more recent 
empirical data from the In re Health Management, Inc. Securities Litigation case.  In 
Health Management, the plaintiffs’ expert estimated that 5.631 million shares were 
damaged using the PTM.120  The claims data submitted showed over 5 million shares 
were submitted for claim, or 89% of the number estimated by the PTM.121  Barclay 
also notes that if reported NASDAQ volume was reduced by 67% (the number 
advocated by Cone and Laurence), instead of 50%, the correlation between shares 
submitted for claim and shares predicted by the proportionate trading model would 
have been more than 90%.122  
                                                                
115Id. 
116Id. 
117Cone & Laurence, supra note 110. 
118See Barclay & Torchio, supra note 63, at 114. 
119Id. 
120Id. at 116-17 (citing In re Health Mgmt., Inc., Sec. Litig., 180 F.R.D. 40 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999)). 
121Id. at 117. 
122Id. 
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D.  Is the Proportionate Trading Model Real Science or Junk Science? 
The Daubert Court stated that the key issue in determining whether a technique is 
scientific knowledge is whether it can or has been tested.123  “Scientific methodology 
is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified.”124  
In so holding, the Daubert Court is roughly summarizing the scientific process 
through paradigms described by Thomas Kuhn in his seminal work, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions.125 
Kuhn describes a “paradigm” as that which is “sufficiently unprecedented to 
attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific 
activity, . . . and sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems . . . to 
resolve.”126  A paradigm is “more successful than [its] competitors in solving a few 
problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.”127  
Certainly, the PTM, with an acceleration factor of one, can be considered a paradigm 
in the classic sense.  It is unprecedented.  In fact the Motorola court recognized it 
was created to solve a particular problem.128  It has attracted a large number of 
adherents.  And to borrow again from Kuhn, all that remains is what he calls 
“puzzle-solving,” i.e. solving problems, refining the theory, and testing it.129   
Every expert and practitioner now uses some form of the PTM.  The issues that 
remain are simply ones of refinement.  The Multi-Trader PTM represented a step 
forward in the evolution of the PTM when it began treating institutional traders 
separately from individual traders.130  The only real issue is not whether the PTM 
should be used but whether an acceleration factor of one should be used or not.  If 
science, paraphrasing Kuhn, consists of finding a theory to explain observed facts 
and provide hypotheses for future events that serves as a working model until 
observed anomalies force a paradigm shift, the PTM seems to function as science.  
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Practitioners in the narrow field of estimating class size use the PTM and use 
observed facts to fit within their particular variants of the paradigms as best they can.   
Using the criteria set forth in Daubert, the PTM also seems to be “real” science 
as opposed to “junk” science.  The Daubert test has four prongs: 1) whether the 
testimony will assist the trier of fact; 2) whether it is subject to peer review and 
publication; 3) the known or potential rate of error; and 4) the general acceptance of 
the theory.  All four prongs support admitting expert testimony using the PTM. 
1.  Assisting the Trier of Fact 
There can be little argument that the PTM will assist the trier of fact.  The 
Advisory Committee notes to FED. R. EVID. 702 state that 
[t]here is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used 
than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be 
qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the 
particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized 
understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.131   
A jury, left to its own devices, would have absolutely no idea how to determine the 
amount of shares damaged by the fraud.  An expert testifying as to damages, using 
the PTM to estimate retention damages and in-and-out damages, is thus an 
invaluable aid to the jury. 
2.  Peer Review 
The PTM, in its most basic form, has been subjected to peer review and 
publication numerous times.  Barclay and Torchio forcefully and persuasively make 
the case that the Multi-Trader PTM, with an acceleration factor of one, is proper.132  
Cone and Laurence argue against an acceleration factor of one, but use a variant of 
the Multi-Trader PTM.  The question being debated in the journals is not whether to 
use the PTM, but which acceleration factor to use.  This is a fact about which 
reasonable minds can disagree, and is a determination best left to the jury. 
3.  Rate of Error 
The rate of error for the Multi-Trader PTM, using an acceleration factor of one, is 
open to discussion.  In some ways, the true rate of error will never be known, but 
attempts have been made to quantify it.  As discussed above, Cone and Laurence 
find a high, and in their view unacceptable, rate of error.133  However, Barclay and 
Torchio, using more current data, find a rate of error within acceptable tolerances, in 
their opinion.134  In the authors’ opinion, the Barclay and Torchio empirical analysis 
is sounder, and the rate of error supports admission of expert testimony using the 
PTM. 
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4.  General Acceptance 
As stated above, the Multi-Trader PTM, which computes damages for 
institutional traders using data from public filings, and then uses this data as a 
starting point to compute non-institutional trading volume, is used by both plaintiffs 
and defendants in most securities cases.  The only difference is the question of which 
acceleration factor to use.  There is general acceptance on using the PTM; there is 
still disagreement on which acceleration factor to use. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The PTM has all the hallmarks of “real” science, using either a scientists’ 
definition or that of the Daubert Court.  From a scientist’s perspective, it is a 
functional paradigm, serving as a working model.  The practitioners in the field are 
engaged in “clean-up,” for example, deciding which acceleration factor best fits 
observed data.  Under the Daubert test, the PTM will assist the trier of fact, has been 
subjected to peer review (unlike the major critique), and has acceptable rates of error 
and general acceptance.  Testifying experts may disagree as to which acceleration 
factor to use, but that is merely fair ground for impeachment and cross-
examination.135  The testimony should be admitted and left to the jury to decide. 
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